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ABSTRACT 
Neo‐liberalism has become one of the boom concepts of our time. From its original reference 
point as a descriptor of the economics of the “Chicago School” such as Milton Friedman, or 
authors such as Friedrich von Hayek, neo‐liberalism has become an all‐purpose descriptor and 
explanatory device for phenomena as diverse as Bollywood weddings, standardized testing in 
schools, violence in Australian cinema, and the digitization of content in public libraries. 
Moreover, it has become an entirely pejorative term: no‐one refers to their own views as 
“neo‐liberal”, but it rather refers to the erroneous views held by others, whether they 
acknowledge this or not. Neo‐liberalism as it has come to be used, then, bears many of the 
hallmarks of a dominant ideology theory in the classical Marxist sense, even if it is often not 
explored in these terms. 
 
This presentation will take the opportunity provided by the English language publication of 
Michel Foucault’s 1978‐79 lectures, under the title of The Birth of Biopolitics, to consider how he 
used the term neo‐liberalism, and how this equates with its current uses in critical 
social and cultural theory. It will be argued that Foucault did not understand neo‐liberalism as a 
dominant ideology in these lectures, but rather as marking a point of inflection in the historical 
evolution of liberal political philosophies of government. It will also be argued 
that his interpretation of neo‐liberalism was more nuanced and more comparative than the 
more recent uses of Foucault in the literature on neo‐liberalism. It will also look at how Foucault 
develops comparative historical models of liberal capitalism in The Birth of Biopolitics, arguing 
that this dimension of his work has been lost in more recent interpretations, which tend to 
retro‐fit Foucault to contemporary critiques of either U.S. neo‐conservatism or the “Third Way” 
of Tony Blair’s New Labour in the UK. 
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The term neo-liberalism has been one of the great academic growth concepts of recent 
years. Boas and Gans-Morse (2009) observed that from only a handful of references in 
the 1980s, the term’s usage exploded in the 2000s to the point where it appeared in 1,000 
social science academic articles annually between 2002 and 2005 (Boas and Morse, 
2009: 138). Similarly, Kipnis (2007) found that in the field of cultural anthropology, 35 
per cent of articles in the journals American Ethnologist and Cultural Anthropology used 
the term between 2002 and 2005, while less than 10 per cent of articles used the term in 
the ten years prior to 2002. The frequency of use has not for the most part been matched 
by greater precision in definition: Boas and Gans-Morse observed that ‘the term is 
effectively used in different ways, such that its appearance in any given article offers 
little clue as to what it actually means’ (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009: 139). Mudge (2008: 
705) has described it as ‘an oft-used term that can mean many things’. The origins of the 
term can be found in economic literature, but here it is ‘used frequently by those who are 
critical of free markets, but rarely by those who view marketisation more positively … in 
part … because neo-liberalism has come to signify a radical form of market 
fundamentalism with which no one wants to be associated’ (Boas and Gans-Morse, 2009: 
138).  
 
With this growth in usage without clear definitions, there has perhaps not surprisingly 
been an inflation of contexts in which it is applied. While early theorists such as Andrew 
Gamble pointed to the need to avoid ‘a tendency to reify neo-liberalism and to treat it as a 
phenomenon which manifests itself everywhere and in everything’ (Gamble, 2001: 134), 
this does indeed seem to have happened in the academic literature on the concept. To take 
a small smattering of examples from a voluminous literature, neo-liberalism has been 
associated with: the rising popularity of Bollywood-style weddings (Kapur, 2009); the 
prevalence of violence in recent Australian cinema (Stratton, 2009); the financial 
difficulties of the University of California (Butler, 2009); the death of politics (Giroux, 
2005); standardized national educational curricula and national testing (Apple, 2004); the 
privileging of access to databases over space for books in Australian public libraries 
(McQueen, 2009); and the performative sexuality of the character of Mr. Garrison in the 
animated comedy series South Park (Gournelos, 2009).  
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In the cultural studies literature, neo-liberalism has been presented as the deux ex 
machina lying behind the rise of creative industries discourse. David Hesmondhalgh has 
argued that ‘neo-liberalism and the neo-classical conception of the market have made 
huge advances in the cultural sphere’, so that ‘strong traditions of public ownership and 
regulation … were abandoned or severely limited during the neo-liberal turn’ 
(Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 135). Des Freedman saw the rise of creative industries policy 
discourse in the UK as being linked to the ‘the neo-liberalization of media policy … 
designed to transform the existing balance of power … to assist the expansion of private 
accumulation and to undermine the legitimacy and existence of non-profit and public 
service media provision’ (Freedman 2008: 224). Toby Miller has consistently proposed 
that ‘neo-liberalism is at the core of the creative industries’ (Miller, 2009: 270), and that 
‘neo-liberalism [has] understood people exclusively through the precepts of selfishness 
[and] it exercised power on people by governing them through market imperatives’ 
(Miller, 2009: 271). The term has also been influential in critiques of reality television, 
with McGuigan (2009) linking neo-liberalism to the rise of ‘cool capitalism’ as promoted 
through reality TV shows such as The Apprentice, while Ouellette and Hay (2008) 
identified neo-liberalism as the governing rationality through which reality television 
programs generally promote self-development and civic well being through celebrities, 
motivational speakers and entrepreneurial initiative in a ‘post-welfare state’.  
 
The risks here are that the uses of the term are becoming largely rhetorical. Referring to 
arguments as “neo-liberal” becomes a way of short circuiting discussion, as it is clearly a 
negative attribute for a person to have, akin to being referred to as a racist or a bourgeois 
ideologue. This ‘negative normative valance’, as Boas and Gans-Morse put it, sits 
alongside the problem that, as Donald Nonini puts it, ‘the term “neo-liberal” has recently 
appeared so frequently, and been applied with such abandon, that it risks being used to 
refer to almost any political, economic, social or cultural process associated with 
contemporary capitalism’ (Nonini, 2008: 149). The cost of developing a term so 
ambiguous that it ‘allows discursive coalitions of the like-minded to form without the 
troublesome bother of having to clarify what exactly it is they oppose or are critical of’ 
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(Nonini, 2008: 149). It can also lead to reification of concepts and a reduction of 
complexities and multiplicities to a kind of all or nothing phenomenon: you either have 
bad neo-liberalism or a largely undefined good society. Authors such as Kipnis (2007) 
and Nonini (2008) are China scholars, and they see the common problem with the use of 
the term in that context, perhaps most famously in David Harvey’s (2005) description of 
‘neo-liberalism with Chinese characteristics’, is that it conflates the important 
phenomenon of the rise of market capitalism in post-1978 China with claims about the 
rise of neo-liberalism as a dominant ideology in China that they seriously doubt. The 
tendency for the term to become both largely pejorative and yet all embracing has been 
reinforced in recent years by the propensity to conflate neo-liberalism with neo-
conservatism (Brown, 2006). This means that a very broad gamut of ideas and 
movements, from religious conservatism to the ‘Tea Party’ movement in the United 
States to the ‘Third Way’ sociology of Anthony Giddens (Giddens, 1998), are all seen as 
emanating from broadly similar intellectual sources. Not surprisingly, Brown presents all 
of this in highly normative and negative terms: neo-liberalism is equated with ‘a radically 
free market: maximized competition and free trade achieved through economic de-
regulation … and a range of monetary and social policies favorable to business and 
indifferent toward poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long term resource 
depletion and environmental destruction’ (Brown, 2003). As no one is going to be in 
favour of indifference towards poverty or cultural deracination, the question is rather one 
of who or what Brown is describing here, as it is unlikely that those accused of such 
neglect will see themselves in such a light. Certainly former leaders such as Bill Clinton 
and Tony Blair would strongly question this interpretation of what their governmental 
agendas were about.  
 
The best known definition of neo-liberalism is the Marxist one, where it is succinctly 
defined by the Marxist geographer David Harvey as: 
 
A theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free 
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market, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional 
framework appropriate to such practices (Harvey, 2005: 2).  
 
Here, neo-liberalism is understood as a global ideological project with its roots in the 
United States and Great Britain, that has aimed to shift power and resources to 
corporations and wealthy elites through the privatization of public assets, removal of 
‘public interest’ regulations over large corporations, and tax cuts targeted towards the 
highest income earners. Such principles were advanced through the global system by 
international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
through which neo-liberal globalization emerged, defined by Scholte (2005b) as ‘an 
economically driven process that should proceed on first principles of private property 
and uninhibited market forces’, and where ‘other economic rules and institutions are 
reduced to a minimum’ (Scholte, 2005b: 1). Fuchs has argued that ‘the capitalist nation-
state has been transformed … into a neo-liberal competitive state’, whose consequences 
have included ‘one the one hand the extension and intensification of economic 
colonization – the commodification of everything – and … the extension and 
intensification of alienation – the almost entire loss of control over economic property, 
political decision making, and value definition … in all realms of life’ (Fuchs, 2008: 108-
109). The rise of media and creative industries is also linked here to the marketization of 
culture, or ‘the process by which market exchange increasingly came to permeate the 
cultural industries and related sectors’ (Hesmondhalgh, 2007: 110).  
 
There are two branches within this broad church of critics of neo-liberalism. For Harvey, 
Hesmondhalgh, Freedman, Scholte and Fuchs, neo-liberalism can be understood in more 
or less straightforwardly Marxist terms, as an ideology imposed on behalf of dominant 
class and big business interests through their control over the state and public policy, 
whether directly through explicitly pro-market governments such as the Conservatives in 
Britain or the Republican Party in the U.S., or by “Third Way” administrations such as 
those of the Clinton Democrats and the British “New Labour” governments of Tony Blair 
and Gordon Brown. For others, such as Jodi Dean (2008), Wendy Brown (2003, 2006) 
and Toby Miller (2009, 2010), neo-liberalism is understood through a synthesis of neo-
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Marxist critiques of political economy with the later work of Michel Foucault on 
governmentality and liberal political rationality (Foucault, 1991; Foucault, 2008).  Dean 
draws upon Foucault to argue that neo-liberalism ‘inverts the early [liberal] model of the 
state as a limiting, external principle supervising the market to make the market form 
itself the regulative principle underlying the state’, thereby ‘reformatting social and 
political life in terms of its ideal of competition within markets’ (Dean, 2008: 48, 49). 
Brown has argued that ‘neo-liberalism casts the political and social spheres both as 
appropriately dominated by market concerns and as themselves organized by market 
rationality … the state itself must construct and construe itself in market terms, as well as 
develop policies and promulgate a political culture that figures citizens exhaustively as 
rational economic actors in every sphere of life’ (Brown, 2006: 694). Miller proposed 
that the ‘grand contradiction of neo-liberalism was its passion for intervention in the 
name of non-intervention  … hailing freedom as a natural basis for life that could only 
function with the heavy hand of policing by government to administer property relations’ 
(Miller, 2010: 56).  
 
This latter group of authors rightly identify the analysis developed by Michel Foucault in 
his 1978-79 lectures at the College de France, published as The Birth of Biopolitics 
(Foucault, 2008) as being ahead of its time in its interest in neo-liberalism. Foucault’s 
interest in the German Ordoliberal theorists and the economists of the Chicago School in 
the U.S. identifies a development in the history of ideas that was only beginning to be 
noted in the 1970s, but which would generate a voluminous literature by the 2000s, under 
the general critical thematic of neo-liberalism. At the same time, there is something 
anachronistic about the readings of Foucault developed by authors such as Dean, Brown 
and Miller, as they appear to be crediting Foucault for anticipating their own critiques of 
U.S. neo-conservatism and Tony Blair’s “Third Way” in the U.K. in the 2000s. While 
this allows such critics to engineer a synthesis of Marx and Foucault, as seen in 
formulations of neo-liberalism such as ‘the commodification of identity within a liberal 
framework, in which freedom, success, rights, and politics become fully integrated into a 
system of commodity and governmentality’ (Gournelos, 2009: 290), it may well be at 
odds with Foucault’s own intentions in his writings at this time. For while neo-liberalism 
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was a minority discourse in 1970s France, Marxism most definitely was not. In France at 
that time, Marxism was the dominant intellectual strand in the humanities, and it received 
a significant degree of concrete political form – in ways that have long been 
inconceivable in the U.S. – in the programs of the Socialist Party (PS), the French 
Communist Party (PCF), and a range of smaller Trotskyist, Maoist and other Marxist 
political groupings. Foucault’s intellectual work was consistently at odds with dominant 
Marxist formulations, particularly in relation to ideology, power and the state, and this 
opposition to Marxism became particularly marked in the 1970s (Barrett, 1991; Eribon, 
1991). 1 
 
* * * * * 
 
It makes sense to read The Birth of Biopolitics as a book of five parts. The first part 
(Chapter 1-3) deal with liberalism as an art of government that comes to ascendancy in 
the 18th century, the relationship it has to political economy and public law, and the 
ambiguous relationship to freedom that it establishes. The second part (Chapters 4-6) 
discuss German ordoliberalism, as both a multifaceted set of theories and concepts, and 
as that which underlies the government al practice of post-1945 West Germany. The third 
part (Chapters 7 and 8) seek to consolidate what neo-liberalism may entail, considering it 
alongside the theories of Marx, Weber and Joseph Schumpeter, and briefly considering 
the difficulties entailed in promoting a neo-liberal governmental program in 1970s 
France. Part four (Chapters 9-10) considers the economics of the “Chicago School” and 
American neo-liberalism across fields such as human capital theory, marriage and child 
rearing, and criminology. Finally, Foucault returns in Chapters 11 and 12 to the implied 
subject of liberalism, the question of civil society and its relationship to both government 
and economy, and the distinctiveness of liberalism as against other governmental 
rationalities.  
 
Foucault declares from the outset that his interest in these lectures lies in the art of 
government. The study of the art of government is not an empirical account of how 
governors actually governed. Rather, it is an attempt to gauge the level of critical 
reflection occurring on what would be the best ways of governing, not as an abstract 
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philosophical exercise, but rather ‘the way in which this practice that consists in 
governing was conceptualized both within and outside government, and anyway as close 
as possible to governmental practice’ (Foucault, 2008: 2). While the method he is 
deploying is not empiricist, it is also not what he terms historicist, in that he is not 
interested in starting from universal categories such as the state, society, sovereignty and 
subjects/the people. Rather, his method is to start from the premise that such universals 
do not exist – as he presumed with his earlier work on madness – and then to consider 
what forms of critical self-reflection and practical action begin to form such concepts and 
bring them into play. The aim, as he puts it, is to ‘start with these concrete practices and 
… pass these universals through the grid of these practices’ (Foucault, 2008: 3).  
 
One of the curious features of these lectures, given their title, is that they do not appear to 
be about biopolitics and bio-power. At several points in these lectures (Foucault, 2008: 
78, 185), Foucault indicates his intention to return to the subject of biopolitics, but it 
never ultimately happens. The study of liberal governmentality was intended to be a 
preamble to such questions, but it takes over the lectures themselves: 
 
I thought I could do a course on biopolitics this year. I will try to show how the 
central core of all these problems that I am presently trying to identify is what is 
called population. Consequently, this is the basis on which something like 
biopolitics could be formed. But it seems to me that the analysis of biopolitics can 
only get under way when we have understood the general regime of this 
governmental reason … that we can call the question of truth, of economic truth in 
the first place, within governmental reason. Consequently, it seems to me that it is 
only when we understand what is at stake in this regime of liberalism opposed to 
raison d’Etat … will we be able to grasp what biopolitics is. (Foucault, 2008: 21-
22) 
 
Why these lectures are about the genealogy of liberal government rather than biopolitics 
has been of considerable interest to Foucault scholars. Gane (2009) has argued that 
Foucault experienced a crisis in his own thoughts about biopolitics, and had ultimately 
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identified it as a conceptual dead-end. The political context may also be relevant, as the 
unexpected defeat of the French left in the 1978 elections, and the abandonment of the 
Union of the Left by the PCF and the intense criticism of that party by those who had 
hitherto remained loyal, such as Louis Althusser, may also have been relevant (Elliott, 
1987: 301-313). For Foucault, the treachery of the PCF would have come as little 
surprise, but this was also a time when he was settling scores with the radical left, and 
increasingly associating himself with a reformist political position broadly in sympathy 
with the Socialist Party led by Francois Mitterand. In an interview conducted in 1974, 
published as “Film and Popular Memory”, Foucault describes his view on the radical left 
in these terms: 
 
There really needs to be a thorough summing-up of what the extreme left has done 
since 1968, both negatively and positively. Its true that the extreme left has been 
the means of spreading a whole number of important ideas: on sexuality, women, 
homosexuality, psychiatry, housing, medicine. It’s also been the means of 
spreading methods of action, where it continues to be of importance. But there’s 
also a negative summing-up to be made, concerning certain Stalinist and terrorist 
organizational practices. And a misunderstanding, too, of certain broad and deeply 
rooted processes which recently resulted in 13 million people backing Mitterand, 
and which has always been disregarded, on the pretext that this was the politics of 
the politicians, that this was the business of the parties. A whole heap of things 
have been ignored; notably, that this desire to defeat the right has been a very 
important political factor within the masses … The extreme left hasn’t sensed this 
desire, thanks to a false definition of the masses, a wrong appreciation of what this 
will to win really is. Faced with the risks a co-opted victory would involve, it 
preferred not to take the risk of winning. Defeat, at least, cannot be co-opted. 
Personally, I’m not so sure (Foucault, 1989: 106 – emphasis added).  
 
I therefore believe that there are significant problems with those readings of these 
lectures within a line of continuity with Marx, Deleuze, Guattari and Althusser, seeing 
biopower as the necessary complement to Marx’s theory of the real subordination of 
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labour to capital in the emergent ‘society of control’. This reading, which is central to 
Hardt and Negri (2000), can also be found in Terranova (2009), Lazzarato (2009), and 
Read (2003). It has become central to those critiques of neo-liberalism associated with 
immaterial labour and the social factory. Without exploring the validity of these accounts 
in their own terms (but see Flew, 2011), I will argue here that they do not gain direct 
licence from these lectures by Michel Foucault at the Collège de France. The account of 
liberalism and neo-liberalism in these lectures, I would argue, presents a critique of 
Marxism as much as it does of neo-liberalism itself, positioning Foucault in a more 
ambiguous political space than this synthesis of his work into the canon of contemporary 
radical thought would suggest.  
 
* * * * * 
 
The starting point of such an analysis is the concept of reason of state  (Raison d’Etat), 
the governmental practice that prevailed in large parts of Europe form the 16th century 
onwards, whereby the state exists as both a pre-existing reality and as an object in the 
process of ongoing construction, and where government and the state are synonymous. 
The core principle of Raison d’Etat was ‘to arrange things so that the state becomes 
sturdy and permanent, so that it becomes wealthy, and so that it becomes strong in the 
face of everything that may destroy it’ (Foucault, 2008: 4). In doing so, three coordinates 
of government were established. The first was the economic principle of mercantilism, 
where the state enriches itself through monetary accumulation, strengthens itself through 
increasing population, and maintains itself through being in a state of permanent 
competition with foreign powers. Second, the practice of internal organization was that of 
police, or ‘the unlimited regulation of the country on the model of a tight-knit urban 
organisation’ (Foucault, 2008: 5). Finally, there is the development of a permanent army 
along with permanent diplomacy as the conditions for securing territory in a world of 
competing and potentially hostile states. Raison d’Etat provides the model and 
underlying rationale for governmentality in early modern Europe, and is the framework 
we are most familiar with from the earlier work of Foucault that has been translated into 
English (Foucault, 1991).  
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The question that lurks behind Raison d’Etat is that of how to set limits to the power of 
the sovereign. From the 17th century onwards, the question of a general ‘principle of 
limitation’ begins to switch from factors that are external to governmental reason and the 
art of government, such as the concept of natural law, to that which is intrinsic to 
governmental reason. What was emerging was a de facto limitation of governmental 
reason, meaning that ‘a government that ignores this limitation will not be an illegitimate, 
usurping government, but simply a clumsy, inadequate government that does not do the 
proper thing’ (Foucault, 2008: 10). This marks out a vital point of distinction between the 
critique of raison d’Etat arising from the juridicial realm, associated with questions of 
sovereignty and legitimacy, and the critique arising from political economy. In the period 
from 1750 to 1810-180, Foucault argues, the term “political economy” ‘oscillates 
between two semantic poles’ (Foucault, 2008: 13): the study of the production, 
distribution and circulation of wealth, and to ‘any method of government that can procure 
the nation’s prosperity’ (Foucault, 2008: 13). It is the latter use of the term “political 
economy” that interests Foucault, as it introduces the question of critical governmental 
reason into the practice of government: 
 
The whole question of critical governmental reason will turn on how not to govern 
too much. The objection is no longer to the abuse of sovereignty but to excessive 
government. And it is by reference to excessive government, or at any rate to the 
delimitation of what would be excessive for a government, that it will be possible to 
gauge the rationality of governmental practice (Foucault, 2008: 13).  
 
Fort Foucault, political economy turns the critique of governmental reason from 
legitimacy or illegitimacy to success or failure, and presents an alternative regime of truth 
to that of raison d’Etat – that of economy in the art of government – which becomes the 
cornerstone of liberalism. It does not emerge in opposition to raison d’Etat, or in a 
relationship that is external to government, but rather presents itself as enabling the goals 
that were initially associated with raison d’Etat – policy, security, and wealth creation – 
to be achieved more effectively. It does so by asking about the effects of different 
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governmental practices – the optimal rate of taxation, or the impact of customs duties, or 
the relationship between wages, effective demand and profits – in achieving the goals of 
government.  
 
This age of frugal government, displacing the unlimited ambitions of raison d’Etat with a 
more precise set of instruments and apparatuses, needs to identify that which sets limits 
to the expansionary ambitions of the state. This lies, not surprisingly, in the developing 
theory of markets, which are now seen less as a site of justice (as in the Medieval notion 
of a just price or the protection of the buyer), and more as a site of truth, in that they can 
reveal certain natural relations between the costs of production and the prices at which 
products are exchanged:  
 
This does not mean that prices are, in the strict sense, true, and that there are true 
prices and false prices. But what is discovered at this moment, at once in 
governmental practice and in reflection on this governmental practice, is that 
inasmuch as process are determined in accordance with the natural mechanisms of 
the market they constitute a standard of truth which enables us to discern which 
governmental practices are correct and which are erroneous … the market 
constitutes a site of veridiction … for governmental practice (Foucault, 2008: 32).  
 
Foucault emphasizes that there is no single cause of the rise of the market as a ‘site of 
truth’ or veridiction, but rather the confluence of multiple forces in 18th century Europe. 
He does, however, want to make two points very clear. The first is that there was a 
symbiotic relationship between the rise of thinking about the market and new questions in 
public law. In many cases, economists were also jurists, such as Jeremy Bentham and 
Beccaria, political economy was often taught within law faculties, and Adam Smith’s The 
Wealth of Nations refers constantly to questions of public law. It was not the case, then, 
that political economy could constitute a form of oppression based upon its manifest 
falsehood of its ideological mystifications of more natural or organic relationships. 
Rather, it established new forms of operationalised public truth alongside which emerged 
new priorities for public law.  
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Second, two quite distinct approaches emerge around the question of how to set juridical 
limits to the exercise of power by public authority. There is the axiomatic, juridico-
deductive approach associated most clearly with the revolutionary tradition of 1789 
France and authors such as Rousseau, which starts from establishing in the abstract what 
the rights of the individual are or should be, and deduces from this the limits of 
governmentality and sovereign power. By contrast, the liberal approach to law starts from 
governmental practice itself, seeking to analyse what the de facto limits of government 
should be in a given concrete situation – and these limits may be set by history, tradition 
or other factors, but there must be a shared sense that they are desirable limits – as well as 
differentiating between ‘those things that it would be pointless for government to 
interfere with’ (Foucault, 2008: 40), and those elements where a case for governmental 
intervention can be made. This leaves us with two conceptions of law – that based on 
rights and that which is based on utility – and two conceptions of freedom – freedom 
from the law and the enabling freedoms derived from governmental practice – that run as 
fault lines through both 19th and 20th century European liberalism.  
 
* * * * *  
 
The domains of governmental practice informed by the new regimes of truth associated 
with political economy and public law multiplied over the course of the 19th and early 
20th centuries, and with these new governmental rationalities came ongoing refinement of 
the technologies of government, as the diverse range of techniques, procedures, 
calculations, surveys, designs and discourses that enable ‘the decisions and actions of 
individuals, groups, organizations and populations … to be understood and regulated in 
relation to authoritative criteria’ (Miller and Rose, 2008: 57). But within this expanding 
governmental practice lies a philosophical conundrum that Foucault identifies as the 
productive/destructive relationship between liberalism and freedom: 
 
This governmental practice in the process of establishing itself is not satisfied with 
respecting this or that freedom. More profoundly, it is a consumer of freedom … 
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inasmuch as it can only function insofar as a number of freedoms actually exist: 
freedom of the market, freedom to buy and sell, the free exercise of property rights, 
freedom of discussion, possible freedom of expression, and so on. The new 
governmental reason needs freedom therefore, the new art of government consumes 
freedom. It consumes freedom, which means that it must produce it … it must 
organize it. The new art of government appears as the management of freedom … 
Liberalism must produce freedom, but this very act entails the establishment of 
limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations relying on threats 
(Foucault, 2008: 63-64).  
 
The cost of this freedom is security. The problem of security lies in both the protection of 
collective interests against individual interests and the protection of individual interests in 
the face of encroachment of collective interests. Foucault argues that ‘the problems of 
what I shall call the economy of power peculiar to liberalism are internally sustained … 
by this interplay of freedom and security’ (Foucault, 2008: 65). Some of the 
consequences of this tension include: 
 
• The perception of exposure to danger, whether it be of exposure to crime, disease, 
sexual deviancy, loss of savings or unemployment, becomes an ‘internal 
psychological and cultural correlative of liberalism’ (Foucault, 2008: 67), even if 
the extent of actual exposure to dangers such as plague, death, war etc. are in fact 
declining; 
• There is a considerable extension of the range of procedures of control, coercion 
and constraint (disciplinary technologies) as a counterweight to the greater focus 
upon the freedoms of the individual; 
• Controls become a way of protecting freedoms, including the rise of various 
forms of social welfare legislation, and the job creating responses to 
unemployment as a response to the Great Depression of the 1930s and associated 
with the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes; 
• The question begins to be asked of whether there is ‘an inflation of the 
compensatory mechanisms of freedom’ (Foucault, 2008: 68), or what would 
 14 
described in the 1970s as a crisis of government arising from an excess of 
demands on the liberal state, leading to inflation of prices and the money supply 
to meet the economic costs of these demands.  
 
* * * * *  
 
Having established the general parameters of what liberalism looks like in terms of an art 
of governmental practice, and how it acquired momentum from the mid-18th century 
through the fields of political economy and public law, as well as the discourse of human 
rights, Foucault then turns to the 20th century and the rise of neo-liberalism. He 
emphasises that he is not developing a general history of liberalism, and that this allows 
him the indulgence of largely bypassing the development of 19th century liberalism 
(Guala, 2006). Nonetheless, this history exists as important background knowledge, since 
his two historical case studies of neoliberal thought and its application in governmental 
practice – the German ordoliberalism of the 1930s and 1940s and the applied neo-
classical economics of the Chicago School in the United States – develop in opposition to 
a form of liberal government that was at its peak in the period immediately after World 
War II. This form of liberal government, which was associated with political forms as 
diverse at the Attlee Labour government in Britain, the Democratic Party administrations 
of Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy and Johnson in the United States, and with Gaullism in 
France, had the following features: 
 
1. General adherence to the principles of demand management derived from the 
economic theories of John Maynard Keynes, particularly around the scope to use 
government spending as a means of maintaining full employment; 
2. Greater use of economic planning instruments to promote balance in the economy 
and drawing upon new forms of government statistics and techniques of economic 
and demographic measurement; 
3. A social program that involved expansion of welfare mechanisms to protect 
citizens from poverty and economic risk. In Britain, this was articulated through 
the Beveridge Plan of ‘cradle to grave’ social security, and in France it was 
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articulated during WWII in the Resistance Charter that proposed ‘a complete plan 
of social security aiming to guarantee every citizen the means of existence, when 
they cannot procure these through work’ (quoted in Foucault, 2008: 97).  
 
In post-WWII Europe, such a program was generally associated with the receipt of U.S. 
assistance through the Marshall Plan, and this contributed to what Foucault terms ‘the 
dirigiste, interventionist, and Keynesian ambience in Europe’ (Foucault, 2008: 81).  
 
It is Germany that takes a different path. The German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard declares 
in 1948 that the priorities of Germany during the reconstruction period would be the 
deregulation of price controls, and the setting of clear boundaries between individuals 
and the state. His point was not only to differentiate the new Germany from the National 
Socialist state of the recent past, but also reflected the challenge facing the German state, 
which could draw upon neither historical rights nor the continuity of its juridical 
institutions as bases for the legitimacy of the state. What instead emerges is a 
performative basis for legitimacy, where the economic freedom of citizens can in itself 
constitute the basis for political legitimacy: 
 
The economy, economic development and economic growth produces … political 
sovereignty through the [economic] institution and institutional game that makes 
this economy work … It produces a permanent consensus of all those who may 
appear as agents within these economic processes, as investors, workers, 
employers, and trade unions. All these economic partners produce a consensus, 
which is a political consensus, inasmuch as they accept this economic game of 
freedom. (Foucault, 2008: 84) 
 
The policy of liberalization was at the cornerstone of the hegemony of the Christian 
Democratic Party (CPD) in its political leadership in what became West Germany from 
the late 1940s to the early 1970s, and has come to be known as the social market 
economy. It was initially opposed by the German socialists in the first instance, but over 
the course of the 1950s, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) moved from a 
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Marxist position to one where, by the time of the Bad Godesburg declaration on 1959, it 
declared itself to be in favour of private property and a competitive market economy 
insofar as these are consistent with an equitable social order. Foucault notes that while 
this is read by Marxists as evidence of the SPD’s betrayal of the class struggle, it entailed 
a recognition that ‘to enter into the political game of the new Germany, the SPD really 
had to convert to these neo-liberal theses, if not to the economic, scientific, or theoretical 
theses, at least to the general practice of this neo-liberalism as governmental practice’ 
(Foucault, 2008: 90).  
 
In order to establish how this neo-liberalism could become hegemonic in Germany at a 
time when the rest of Europe was strongly committed to the Keynesian welfare state and 
economic planning, Foucault develops a genealogical analysis of the theories of those 
around Chancellor Erhard in 1948. This included economists such as Walter Eucken, 
Franz Bohm, Müler-Armack, Wilhelm Ropke and others, who published in the journal 
Ordo (founded in 1936) and who were known as the Freiberg School of political 
economists. His interest in the Freiberg School, also known as the Ordoliberals, stemmed 
from two issues. First, he explores their relationship to the work of Max Weber. Foucault 
argues that, in early 20th century Germany, Weberianism had displaced Marxism as 
presenting the core problematic in German social thought. For Weber, the contradiction 
of capitalism lay less in the contradictory logic of capital and more in the irrational 
rationality of capitalist society. In other words, capitalism can function effectively on the 
economic plane – contra Marx – but it does so by generating irrationalities and tensions 
on the social plane. One response to this was that of the Frankfurt School, which sought 
to identify a new social rationality that could nullify the economic irrationality of 
capitalism. The other, associated with the Freiberg School, looked to an economic 
rationality that could nullify the social irrationality of capitalism.  
 
The second reason for considering the Freiberg School relates to their historical narrative 
of modern Germany, where they argue that it has been precisely the obstacles to 
liberalism and liberal politics that provided the historical roots of Nazism. From Freidrich 
List’s proposition that national economy needed to be prioritized over free trade, to 
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Bismarckian state socialism that unified the people to the state by both welfare policy and 
the suppression of dissent, to the maintenance of economic planning after World War I 
and the turn to Keynesianism in 1930, they saw the roots of Nazism as an end-point of a 
well established path of a protected economy, state socialism, economic planning, and 
Keynesian interventionism. All pointed towards the unlimited expansion of state power 
and a kind of mass society that crosses the capitalism/socialism divide but is consistent in 
its rejection of the liberal problematic that the power of the state needs to be somehow 
constrained.  
 
The implication of their analysis of recent German history was that, rather than seeing 
social irrationalities as a consequence of the market economy, they were instead 
indicative of an unconstrained state. In terms of the history of liberal economic thought, 
this challenged the tradition of liberalism from Adam Smith to John Maynard Keynes 
that asked what role the state should play to limit the harmful effects of the market, and 
instead proposed that the state should instead be under the supervision of the market. For 
the Ordoliberals: 
 
Nothing proves that the market economy is intrinsically defective since everything 
attributed to it as a defect and as the effect of its defectiveness should really be 
attributed to the state. So, let’s do the opposite and demand even more from the 
market economy than was demanded from it in the eighteenth century … let’s ask 
the market economy itself to be the principle, not of the state’s limitation, but of its 
internal regulation from start to finish of its existence and action. (Foucault, 2008: 
116) 
 
It must be understood that this is not a reversion to classical liberalism. It changes the 
problematic of liberalism in three important ways. First, the focus on the market is shifted 
from its role as a system of exchange that generates prices to a mechanism that ensures 
competition. Second, the focus of competition shifts from the question of whether or not 
markets are competitive, and the related issue of whether governments should intervene 
in markets that are not purely competitive, to the idea that competition is not a natural 
 18 
order but rather an artefact of policy: ‘Pure competition must and can only be an 
objective, an objective thus presupposing an indefinitely active policy. Competition is 
therefore an historical objective of governmental art and not a natural given that must be 
respected’ (Foucault, 2008: 120). Finally, they depart from the earlier liberal conception 
of the market/competition and state/government as different and delimited domains. 
Rather, the market and competition ‘can only appear … if it is produced by an active 
governmentality … One must govern for the market, rather than because of the market’ 
(Foucault, 2008: 121).  
 
The neo-liberalism that is emerging is, for Foucault, a new phenomenon. He is very clear 
that it is not simply a reversion to older economic theories, it is not simply class rule by 
another name, nor is it simply about new mechanisms of state control developed under 
the ideological cloak of freedom. For Foucault, such responses ‘ultimately make neo-
liberalism out to be nothing at all, or … nothing but always the same thing, and always 
the same thing but worse’ (Foucault, 2008: 130). The question for Foucault is how to 
draw out the features of this historically new phenomenon ‘in order to tray and detach it 
from these critiques made on the basis of the pure and simple transposition of historical 
moulds’: 
 
Neo-liberalism is not Adam Smith; neo-liberalism is not market society; neo-
liberalism is not the Gulag on the insidious scale of capitalism. (Foucault, 2008: 
131) 
 
In order to consider how such ideas came to be disseminated internationally, he draws 
attention to a remarkable historical document, the proceedings of the Walter Lippmann 
Colloquium held in Paris in July 1939. He notes that the Colloquium was attended by 
traditional liberals such as Lippmann, the economists of the Freiberg School, and the 
Austrian economists Freidrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, among many others. A 
key theme that Foucault picks out from the Colloquium – and the historical timing is very 
significant – is the call for ‘positive liberalism’. ‘Positive liberalism’ distinguishes itself 
from the liberalism of the 18th century in that it rejects the distinction between what is 
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referred to as ‘the agenda and the non-agenda’, or ‘whether there are things you cannot 
touch and others that you are entitled to touch’. Viewing this as ‘naïve naturalism’, the 
participants in the Colloquium instead see the problem in terms of ‘how you touch them 
… the problem, if you like, of governmental style’ (Foucault, 2008: 133).  
 
An example of the new liberalism can be seen in the discussion of monopolies. There had 
long been the question of whether competitive markets led to monopolies, and whether 
this negated the economic analysis of classical liberalism, creating a new case for state 
intervention and private ownership. Even champions of entrepreneurial capitalism such 
as Joseph Schumpeter were pessimistic about the prospects of capitalism in the face of 
monopoly, believing that this concentration of power would suck out the innovative 
forces of the system and tend towards bureaucratic socialism (Schumpeter, 1950). The 
neo-liberal response identifies the problem of monopoly as the result, not of markets, but 
of the uses of state power and systems of regulation, presenting the question as instead 
one of generating institutional frameworks that act to minimize the possibility of others 
acting to create a monopoly.  
 
Another shift arose in the preferred relationship between social policy and economic 
policy, which Eucken would identify as the relationship between conformable actions, or 
those which support the market system, and organizing actions, or those outside of the 
remit of economic relations that nonetheless shape social and institutional relations in 
ways that make them more amenable to preferred forms of economic policy. The major 
division here between neo-liberals and classical liberalism – particularly in its more 
social democratic variants associated with Keynes, the Beveridge Plan and the New Deal 
– was that the latter conceived of social policy as ‘a counterweight to unrestrained 
economic processes which it is reckoned will induce inequality and generally destructive 
effects on society if left to themselves’ (Foucault, 2008: 142). The neo-liberals, by 
contrast, believed that social policy should work to support economic policy, rather than 
operate as a counterweight to it. Thus, social policy based on the principle of the social 
market economy saw active labour market policy rather than benefit payments as the best 
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response to unemployment. More generally, such new forms of social policy was 
designed to promote an enterprise society based upon the principles of competition:  
 
The society regulated by reference to the market that the neo-liberals are thinking 
about is a society in which the regulatory principle should be not so much the 
exchange of commodities as the mechanisms of competition. It is these 
mechanisms that should have the greatest possible surface and depth and should 
also occupy the greatest possible volume in society. This means that what is sought 
is not a society subject to the commodity-effect, but a society subject to the 
dynamic of competition. Not a supermarket society, but an enterprise society. The 
homo economicus sought after is not the man of exchange or man the consumer; he 
is the man of enterprise and production. (Foucault, 2008: 147) 
 
* * * * *  
 
At this point it is worth making some points about how Foucault has approached neo-
liberals, both in terms of what it is and what it is not. Some of the core elements of this 
new model for governmental action were: 
 
1. Generalisation of the enterprise form through the whole of society; 
2. Legal and regulatory frameworks that act to promote competition, rather than 
control its adverse effects; 
3. Social policy that aims to stimulate economic activity and the market economy 
rather than to compensate for its adverse effects; 
4. Policy activism that begins from the premise that markets and competition are not 
‘naturally’ grounded in society, but which require a kind of ‘positive liberalism’ 
in order to continually promote and stimulate them; 
5. Somewhat paradoxically, a judicial activism which aims to set limits to the 
discretionary application of state power, against the premises of Keynesianism 
and economic planning which are seen to promote unlimited expansion of the 
decision-making capacities of the state.  
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There is a need at this point to also be clear as to what the program of the German 
Ordoliberals was not. It was not a rejection of the role of the state in shaping and 
supporting the social order. In particular, the establishment of the social market economy, 
and the measures to generalise the enterprise form through society, were accompanied by 
what Ropke referred to as a Vitalpolitik, or a ‘politics of life’. This was a highly activist 
social program to ‘shift the centre of gravity of governmental action downwards’, and 
included such policies as the promotion of medium-sized towns, promoting private home 
ownership, encouraging small business and craft industries, supporting small farming, 
decentralizing industry and employment, and undertaking active environmental 
management of production (Foucault, 2008: 147-148). Whatever else we may say about 
such a list, it is not evidence of a rejection of an activist role for government in social 
policy. It addresses the paradox of how to promote “warm” moral and cultural values in 
the face of the “cold” logic of the ‘strictly economic gaze’ of competition and the 
enterprise form, a paradox that featured strongly in the work of Max Weber. However, 
for some neo-liberals, such as von Hayek, this Gesellschaftpolitik extended the role of the 
state beyond that which he saw as appropriate, and it led to German political economy 
moving in quite different directions to those which would be associated with the 
American tradition of neo-liberalism. 
 
* * * * * 
 
The second case study Foucault develops in The Birth of Biopolitics is that of American 
neo-liberalism. Foucault begins by noting that the period from the 1930s to the 1960s 
marked out a significant qualitative shift in governmental practice in the United States, 
with the New Deal of the 1930s, wartime planning, post-WWII social security programs 
for returned soldiers, and the ‘Great Society’ programs of the 1960s all pointing in the 
direction of an expansion of the role of government in economic and social life. While 
such developments were similar to those taking place in much of Europe over this period, 
there is a major historical difference in that: 
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American liberalism at the moment of its historical formation … did not present 
itself, as in France, as a moderating principle with regard to a pre-existing raison 
d’Etat, since liberal type claims, and essentially economic claims moreover, were 
precisely the historical starting point for the formation of American independence. 
(Foucualt, 2008: 217) 
 
Liberalism was thus grounded in the very establishment of government in the United 
States, where it has been ‘appealed to as the founding and legitimizing principle of the 
state. The demand for liberalism founding the state, rather than the state limiting itself 
through liberalism … is one of the features of American liberalism’ (Foucault, 2008: 
217). This historical grounding gives debates about liberalism in the United States a quite 
different context to that of Germany, where the ascendancy of liberalism emerges from 
the ashes of Nazism, or France where it exists in partial opposition to strong and 
continuing traditions of raison d’Etat.2 In particular, Foucault argues that whereas in 
Europe liberalism appears as ‘an economic and political choice formed and formulated by 
those who govern and within the governmental milieu’, in the American context it is ‘a 
whole way of being and thinking’, so that ‘disputes between individuals and government 
look like the problem of freedoms’ (Foucault, 2008: 218). This utopian strand of 
American liberalism had particular appeal to European exiles such as von Hayek, who 
saw a need for liberalism to be more than simply a technical mode of government, and to 
present itself as a utopia – ‘a general state of thought, analysis, and imagination’ – that 
could challenge the pre-eminence of the socialist tradition in utopian thought (Foucault, 
2008: 219). 
 
The discussion of American neo-liberalism proceeds down two paths. The first is to 
consider the concrete contribution to both economic thought and public policy made by 
the economists of the Chicago School, such as Theodore Schultz, Gary Becker, Jacob 
Mincer and others associated with the Journal of Political Economy, through the theory 
of human capital. While such a theory would appear to have some commonalities with 
the work of Marx, Foucault observes that these authors ‘practically never argue with 
Marx for reasons that we may think are to do with economic snobbery’ (Foucault, 2008: 
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220). That said, Foucault argues that human capital theory aims to shift the locus of 
economic analysis away from the concerns of the classical economists (including Marx) 
with aggregate relations between production, consumption and exchange, towards the 
choices made by individuals at the margins of decision-making. In the case of human 
capital theory, this involves shifting the focus away from the supply and demand for 
labour power, towards the notion of the individual – homo economicus – as an 
‘entrepreneur of himself’, who allocates their time and resources between consumption 
and the generation of personal satisfaction, and investment in the self (human capital, 
which can also include investment in the family). Such an individual is not, for the neo-
liberals, an alienated subject, but is rather an investor, an innovator, and an entrepreneur 
of the self. 
 
While human capital theory has been taken up in a wide variety of contexts, from 
development economics to Scandinavian welfare capitalism, it is Foucault’s contention 
that American neo-liberalism is more radical than German Ordoliberalism in the 
relationship it envisages between markets and society. As was noted earlier, the German 
Vitalpolitik was concerned with the balance between the “cold” mechanisms of 
competition and the “warm” moral and cultural values that contributed to social cohesion, 
and various mechanisms were devised so that the individual is not alienated from their 
work environment, family, community or the natural environment, by a state that sought 
to ‘maintain itself above the different competing groups and enterprises’ and act as a 
guarantor of co-operation among the competing interests (Foucault, 2008: 242, 243). 
From the early schemas of neo-liberalism, therefore, we can find the roots of what would 
be referred to as German neo-corporatism, seen as an alternative to market liberalism 
(Esping-Anderson, 1991; Phelps, 2009). Foucault argues that American neo-liberalism, 
by contrast, did not seek to soften the impact of the market. It instead sought ‘the 
generalization of the economic form of the market … throughout the social body and 
including the whole of the social system not usually conducted through or sanctioned by 
monetary exchange’ (Foucault, 2008: 243). This generates significant intellectual 
innovation, with economic theories of crime, the family, marriage, capital punishment 
etc., but it is not an idle academic exercise. What instead emerges is the application of 
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market principles to engage in ‘a permanent criticism of political and governmental 
action’, undertaken through entities such as the American Enterprise Institute, through 
which operates ‘a sort of permanent economic tribunal confronting government … that 
claims to assess government action in strictly economic and market terms’ (Foucault, 
2008: 246, 247).  
 
The Birth of Biopolitics and the Debate about Neo-
Liberalism 
 
One of the most interesting features in reading these lectures is how prescient Michel 
Foucault was in identifying the eclectic strands of thinking that bring together theorists of 
the German social market economy, the Austrian economists such as von Hayek and von 
Mises, and the Chicago School of political economists such as Milton Friedman, George 
Stigler and Gary Becker. While there now exists an extensive literature on entities such 
as the Mont Pelerin Society that acted to bring such thinkers together (Peck, 2008; 
Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009), this was a very original and distinctive line of research for 
Foucault to undertake in 1978-79. It is also notable that it preceded the more obvious 
triggers for a critical appraisal of neo-liberalism, such as the election of Margaret 
Thatcher in Britain in 1979 and the Reagan presidency in the United States from 1980.  
Indeed, his practical case of neo-liberal government in action – West Germany since 
1948 – would not have been thought of as being right-wing at the time, as it was led in 
the 1970s by the Social Democrats under Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. Insofar as 
such issues were being addressed in the English-speaking world, it was more to do with 
the potential for conservatism to establish ideological appeal among the working classes; 
little attention was given to the potential to construct a reasonably consistent and coherent 
governmental program around a revised understanding of relations between the market 
and the state. In Foucault’s own milieu of radical French intellectuals, debate was more 
about whether the state was heading in the direction of fascism; debates about reforming 
the techniques and practices of government in 1970s France appear to have been more 
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confined to the administrators and intellectuals around the Giscard-Barre governments as 
they addressed the dirigiste and interventionist tendencies of Gaullism.  
 
Another very striking feature of Foucault’s presentation of neo-liberalism in these 
lectures is the non-judgmental commentary on them. It would be going too far, as 
Behrent (2009) argues, to say that Foucault was providing a qualified endorsement of 
neo-liberalism in these lectures. At the same time, he is clearly not engaged in the kind of 
excoriating critique assumed by contemporary interlocutors such as Brown (2006), Dean 
(2008) and Miller (2010). The lectures consistently reject the easy critique of neo-
liberalism as ideology, presenting it as neither ‘a convenient cover for an underlying 
reality of oppression and domination’ or as ‘pseudo-science, to be exposed and 
condemned as the servant of whatever power is in place’ (Guala, 2006: 433). He instead 
observes how the question of what would be ‘too much’ or ‘too little’ government 
presents itself as a recurring question in liberal modes of governmentality, and how they 
exist alongside the recurring themes of Raison d’Etat which are by no means displaced 
by political economy in either its classical liberal or neo-liberal forms.  
 
This intensive reading of the changing governmental logics of liberalism allows Foucualt 
to ask the question of what would socialist arts of government look like. He argues that 
while socialism ‘possesses … rational techniques of … administrative intervention, in 
domains such as health, social insurance, and so on’, there is ‘no governmental rationality 
of socialism’ (Foucault, 2008: 92). Socialism has developed alongside liberal 
governmentality, sometimes adopting its techniques, and sometimes rejecting them or 
acting as a palliative or corrective, but there is not an ‘autonomous governmentality of 
socialism’. At the same time, it is very characteristic of socialist thought to seek a ‘truth’ 
of socialism that can be evaluated against actual governmental practice. In considering 
whether the revisionists of the SPD abandoned socialism with the Bad Gotesburg 
program of 1959, it begs the question of whether ‘true’ socialism was to be found in West 
Germany under Helmut Schmidt, East Germany under Erich Honecker, or whether both 
are betrayals of ‘true’ socialism as measured by ‘conformity to a text, or to a series of 
texts’ (Foucault, 2008: 94). By contrast, liberalism is not so troubled by such questions of 
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truth or falsehood, or the conformity to set texts. It works with the different questions of 
‘what rules it adopts for itself, how it offsets compensating mechanisms, how it calculates 
the mechanisms of measurement it has installed within its governmentality’ (Foucault, 
2008: 93). This is not a pure pragmatism, but it is more of a ‘coupling of a set of practices 
and a regime of truth [that] form an apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power’ 
(Foucault, 2008: 19) than an ideology or a pure regime of truth of the sort that Foucault 
found in socialist thought. I believe that Foucault’s address of such issues tells us much 
about what motivated him to explore neo-liberalism as a governmental rationality: he 
wanted to ask the question of what a socialist governmentality would look like: 
 
What would really be the governmentality appropriate to socialism? Is there a 
governmentality appropriate to socialism? What governmentality is possible as a 
strictly, intrinsically and autonomously socialist governmentality? In any case, we 
know only that if there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden 
within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented. 
(Foucault, 2008: 94) 3 
 
As these were intellectual tropes most commonly associated with Marxism, it makes 
sense in my view to read these lectures as seeking to propose an alternative way of 
reading contemporary government to the Marxist schema, with its focus upon power, 
domination, ideology and the state. One of the reasons why Germany presents itself as 
being of interest to Focuault in these lectures is that it allows him to think about historical 
capitalism from within a Weberian rather than a Marxist problematic, as a system that 
can develop economic consistency and coherence, but one that in doing so generates new 
contradictions and tensions in the social plane, as a ‘principle of dissociation’ within civil 
society with regard to community, compassion, benevolence etc. (Foucault, 2008: 302). 
This problematic, along with the question of whether competition serves to negate itself 
through the creation of monopoly, generate a range of responses that are of interest to 
Foucault, from Sombart, Schumpeter, Eucken, von Hayek, and the American ‘Chicago 
School’, that has little to do with the assumption derived from Marxism that capitalism is 
an inherently contradictory economic system.  
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This opens up further lines of enquiry in the study of historical capitalism. One is the 
relationship of law to economics. Foucault observes that the ordoliberals were clear that 
the juridical sphere was never simply part of the superstructure to the economic base. 
Rather, ‘the juridical gives form to the economic, and the economic would not be what it 
is without the juridical’ (Foucault, 2008: 163). It was Max Weber who had the best grasp 
of this, and the existence of such an economic-juridical ensemble means that: 
 
The economic must be considered as a set of regulated activities from the very 
beginning … with rules of completely different levels, forms, origins, dates, and 
chronologies; rules which may comprise a social habitus, a religious prescription, 
an ethics, a competitive regulation, and also a law. (Foucault, 2008: 163) 
 
Foucault is quite explicit about the political stake entailed in the two problematics. If one 
begins from the Marxist proposition that ‘there can only be one capitalism since there is 
only one logic of capital’, then historical capitalism simply entails determining which 
institutions favoured its development and which impeded it. A consequence of such an 
approach is that in the present era one can only see the contemporary impasses of 
capitalism as being resolved through forces internal to the logic of capital and its 
accumulation, so that ‘the end of capitalism is revealed in the historical impasses it is 
currently manifesting’ (Foucault, 2008: 164-165). By contrast, if we see “capital” as a 
process that is within pure economic theory, and which only acquires an empirical reality 
through economic-institutional capitalism in its specific historical forms, we have a 
capitalism that can be subject to significant economic-institutional transformations. By 
working with the Weberian rather than the Marxian problematic, the ordoliberals 
understood that one can have a ‘different capitalism’ through reforms to institutions and 
the legal framework. The challenge that Foucault was presenting to his audience in the 
1978-79 Collège de France lectures, in his detailed explication of the rise of neo-
liberalism as a governmental rationality, was whether the political left was as capable of 
such innovations in governmental practice and institutional frameworks to develop such a 
‘different capitalism’, that would not be reliant upon the received authority of conformity 
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to texts, instead trying to ‘define for itself its way of doing things and its way of 
governing’ (Foucault, 2008: 94).  
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1 As a student in the aftermath of World War II, Foucault was greatly influenced by Marxism as were most 
French intellectuals of that generation. He was a member of the PCF in the first part of the 1950s, but left 
for reasons connected in part to the Party’s uncritical support for Stalin’s rule in the Soviet Union, but very 
possibly also to the party’s position on homosexuality to the time. Eribon (1991) tracks the complex 
development of Foucault’s political positions during the 1970s, from a position that was well to the left of 
the PCF in the early 1970s, to a growing frustration with the parties of the French left in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. He was consistently critical of the Soviet Union and supported Eastern European dissident 
movements, and frequently defined his own political thought in opposition to Marxism. Gordon (1991) 
argues that Foucault’s growing interest in the concept of governmentality arose from his frustration with 
the absence of a distinctive socialist art of governing and the electoral failings of the PS and PCF in the 
1970s.  
2 The obvious missing case study for Foucault is that of Britain, the intellectual home of Keynesian 
liberalism, and the nation that would experience the most convulsions in its economic policy prior to and 
following the election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservatives in 1979. Britain is also interesting in that it 
provided the basis for one of the most influential alternative theorizations of neo-liberalism, which is that 
developed by Stuart Hall of ‘Thatcherism’ in the 1980s (Hall, 1988). Comparing Foucault’s account to that 
of Hall is instructive in illustrating key differences in approach and method.  
 
First, Hall attributed the rise of Thatcherism to the changing ideologies of sections of the British working 
class, most notably skilled male English-born workers, who were attracted to the combination of free 
market policies and the emphasis on law and order and British nationalism. As Hirst (1989) observed, this 
demonstrated the pitfalls of what he termed the pessimism of electoral sociology, where particular changes 
in voting behaviour, as seen in the Conservative election wins of 1979, 1983 and 1987, are taken to 
demoinstrate wider shifts in hegemony and public consciousness, rather than limitations of Labour’s 
prporsed policies and electoral platform. Hirst noted that the discussion was not a new one, and in fact 
paralleled – in more Marxist language – debates in the British Labour Party in the late 1950s and early 
1960s about the implications of suburbanization and the rise of the ‘affluent worker’; at any rate, the 
Labour victories of 1997 and 2001 were premised upon precisely these voting groups voting for the Labour 
Party led by Tony Blair. By presenting the rise of neo-liberalism as part of a longue duree of liberal 
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challenges to Raison d’Etat that present the market as a countervailing source of knowledge and moral 
authority, Foucault’s accont is not contingent upon the exigencies of electoral behaviour or claims about 
wider transformations in popular consciousness. 
 
Second, Hall’s perspective on the state is strongly influenced by the work the neo-Marxist of Nicos 
Poulantzas, meaning that he seeks to map state policies onto wider shifts in the composition of social 
classes and changing patterns of social relations. The resulting difficulty with this neo-Marxist state theory, 
as Johnston (1986: 67) observed, ‘leaves us with the uncomfortable inference that the study of state 
institutions is something of an irrelevance’. By contrast, Foucault foregoes a theory of the state in the way 
that ‘one can and must forego an indigestible meal (Foucault, 2008: 77), and he instead proposes that ‘the 
state is nothing else but the mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’ (Foucault, 2008: 77). 
In other words, his interest is in how particular domains come to be brought within regimes of 
governmental rationality, and what the changing techniques of government policy are towards those 
domains, rather than the classical Marxist question of who controls the state apparatuses.  
 
Finally, Hall presented the problem of the British left in terms of its need for cultural modernization. The 
risk here, as arguably happened with the rise of New Labour, was that this would accompanied by a 
modernization of the economic platform that largely entailed marginalizing the influence of the left within 
the party (Thorpe, 2008). Foucault’s question, which is in my view a more interesting one, is whether the 
left can develop a pragmatics of governing that does not simply rely upon Raison d’Etat and which can 
match liberal thought in terms of intellectual agility, rather than simply deriving policy prescriptions from 
received doctrines or texts.  
 
3 In 1972, the PCF and the PS signed the Common Programme (Programme commun) that was intended to 
provide the guiding principles for a government based upon the ‘Union of the Left’. It proposed a set of 
measures that included higher wages, expansion of the public sector, nationalisation of large firms in key 
industries, strengthening the rights of workers, growth of public education, health care and public housing, 
and democratization of public institutions. Such a program was seen by the PCF as being ‘transtional’ in 
that it would further the move from capitalism to socialism, while it also indicated the preparedness of the 
PCF to be a part of existing democratic institutions. There was typically little thought given to this program 
as the basis of public policy: its importance was instead symbolic in indicating what would be the minimum 
demands of the PCF in remaining in a coalition with the PS. On the Common Programme and the decline 
of the PCF in 1970s France, see Sassoon, 1996: 534-554.  
